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BENJAMIN CURTIS: TOP OF THE LIST
R. OWEN WILLIAMS*
When did you last hear mention of Dred Scott,' the case, its many
opinions, or the Justices who sat for it, without a near simultaneous use of
the words "best" or "worst"? The majority and dissenting opinions of Dred
Scott, as well as the Justices who wrote them, appear on a range of best and
worst lists. Ranking Supreme Court Justices and Supreme Court opinions is
no trivial pursuit, and for legal historians and even the Justices themselves,
it is a temptation too difficult to resist. In 1928, Charles Evans Hughes,
between his terms as Associate and Chief Justice of the Court, published a
list of "great" Justices. The following decade, Harvard Law School Dean
Roscoe Pound produced his own such list. In 1957, Felix Frankfurter com-
posed a roster of "greats" that, by dint of munificence and lapsed time,
contained more names than the Hughes and Pound registers combined.2 In
1970, Albert Blaustein and Roy Mersky provided a systematic study on the
topic, having polled sixty-five legal, history, and political science scholars
(seven of them from the University of Texas at Austin), which yielded a
catalog of twelve "greats" and fifteen "near greats" among the ninety-six
Justices up to that time. 3 Neither Benjamin Curtis nor Roger Taney, the
best known of the Dred Scott Justices, qualified for Pound's group of four
greats. Curtis, however, was one of Hughes's eight greats, and both Curtis
* Ph.D. candidate, History Department at Yale University, currently studying for a M.S.L. at
Yale Law School. I would like to thank my editor, Joel Eagle, and the staff of the Chicago-Kent Law
Review for their enhancements to this article.
1. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
2. Hughes's list: Marshall, Story, Curtis, Miller, Field, Bradley, Gray, Brewer. Pound's list:
Marshall, Story, Holmes, Cardozo. Frankfurter's list: Marshall, W. Johnson, Story, Taney, Curtis,
Campbell, Miller, Field, Bradley, Matthews, White, Holmes, Moody, Hughes, Brandeis, Cardozo. (All
three listed Justices chronologically.) LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A. SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS
G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS 369 tbl.5-8
(2d ed. 1996).
3. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES 34-40
(1978); see also WILLIAM D. BADER & ROY M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED EIGHT JUSTICES
22-27 (2004). Members of the University of Texas faculty who participated in Blaustein and Mersky's
poll: Albert W. Alschuler, Wallace Mendelson, Owen Olpin, George Schatzki, Allen E. Smith, Russell
J. Weintraub, and Charles Alan Wright. See BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra at 117-18 tbl.4. By 1970,
ninety-six Justices had been appointed, and the ninety-seventh, Warren Burger, was confirmed that
year. Id. at 35-36.
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and Taney appeared on Frankfurter's roll of sixteen great Justices. 4
Blaustein and Mersky, on the other hand, categorized Taney as "great" and
Curtis as "near great."'5 Bernard Schwartz, the king of list makers, com-
posed a whole book of legal lists in. 1997, in which he ranked Taney as the
tenth best Justice. He also tallied the ten worst opinions of the Court (with
Taney's Dred Scott opinion as the very worst), and the ten best dissents
(with Curtis's Dred Scott dissent as the very best). 6 All of these lists proba-
bly provide more entertainment than education.
I. EARL MALTZ AND "BENJAMIN CURTIS, THE LAST ANGRY MAN"
' 7
Without denying the legitimacy of Curtis as a "great" Justice, Earl
Maltz describes him as a Justice whose opinion was "distorted
by ... anger."' 8 Maltz agrees that the Justice's favorable "reputation is well-
deserved," particularly with regards to his famous dissent.9 Specifically,
"Curtis's argument on the issue of slavery in the territories is entirely con-
vincing, and his treatment of the substance of the citizenship issue is noth-
ing short of a tour deforce."'1o But, when it comes to the constitutionality
4. See EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & THOMAS, supra note 2, at 369 tbl.5-8.
5. BLAUSTEIN & MERSKY, supra note 3, at 37.
6. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS 20-22, 70-71, 89-90 (1997). Taney, tenth on
Schwartz's list of ten best Justices, was "second only to Marshall in laying our constitutional law
foundation" including police power limitations of property rights (public over private rights), and the
opening of corporate expansion (e.g. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 420
(1837)). Id. at 20-22.
One of Schwartz's lists is especially interesting: Ten Greatest Supreme Court "Might Have
Beens." Number five on this list is the opinion written by Justice Samuel Nelson after conference for
Dred Scott. Schwartz points out, "The conference felt that the issue of citizenship was not properly
before them and also took the position that they need not consider the Missouri Compromise because
Scott's status was a matter for Missouri law and had already been determined against him by the state's
highest court." It was not until after Justice James M. Wayne from Georgia put citizenship on the table
that the majority determined to deal with the issue. Supported by five fellow slave-staters, Wayne could
later brag to a southern senator that he had "gained a triumph for the southern section of the coun-
try... Curtis later recalled that Wayne had wanted to "get rid of the question of slavery in the Terri-
tories, by a decision of the Supreme Court." The New York Herald editorialized that it was not Dred
Scott but the Court itself that was on trial, Id. at 116-18.
7. Professor Earl M. Maltz is the author of CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS,
1863-1869 (1990); THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION (2003)
[hereinafter MALTZ, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT]; RETHINKING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: ORIGINALISM,
INTERVENTIONISM, AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1994); and over fifty articles on constitu-
tional law, statutory interpretation, the role of the courts, and legal history. He received his B.A. from
Northwestern University, where he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, and his J.D. cum laude from Har-
vard. Professor Maltz teaches Constitutional Law, Employment Discrimination, Conflicts of Law, and a
seminar on the Supreme Court at Rutgers School of Law (Camden).
8. Earl M. Maltz, The Last Angry Man: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Dred Scott Case, 82
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 265 (2007).
9. Id.
10. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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of the Missouri Compromise, Maltz contends that Curtis was "quite angry"
and essentially lost his way." 1 While he never says as much, the story Maltz
presents is of a Justice tripped up by his own conservative anger. The main
point of Maltz's very brief paper is that the traditional view of Benjamin
Curtis-a Justice dispassionate in his approach to the law-is incorrect. In
order to understand Curtis appropriately, one has to examine the technical
aspects of his famous dissent, none of which can be reduced to mere noise.
Maltz informs us that Benjamin Robbins Curtis was a Harvard-
educated Massachusetts Whig whose opposition to slavery factored less
than his concern for the bond among states. 12 Believing slavery to be
clearly wrong, Curtis knew that the peculiar institution of slavery threat-
ened the sanctity of union among the states and that Southern interests
should thus be granted substantial leeway. 13 Indeed, in the 1836 case of
Commonwealth v. Aves, 14 Curtis unsuccessfully argued for the domain of
southern slaveholders traveling with their slaves, a position for which abo-
litionists subsequently vilified him. In 1850, he publicly counseled obedi-
ence to the recently passed Fugitive Slave Act, 15 insisting that while slaves
had natural rights, Massachusetts bore no responsibility to enforce them. 16
According to Maltz, "living in harmony with the slave states was a domi-
nant theme in Curtis's thinking," so much so that the "political upheaval of
the mid-1850s had left him a man without a party."17 But his increasing
political independence, coupled with the strong support of the greatest of
all compromisers, Daniel Webster, landed Curtis on the Supreme Court
upon the death of fellow New Englander Levi Woodbury. President Fill-
more gladly bypassed the opposition of antislavery forces and appointed
the forty-two year old as the thirty-second Justice of the Supreme Court in
September 1851.18
In examining Curtis's Dred Scott dissent, Maltz highlights three cen-
tral components of the opinion: black citizenship, slavery in the territories,
and the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise. 19 As to the first,
black citizenship, Maltz proclaims that Curtis's opinion-"that national
citizenship derived from citizenship in the state in which a person was
11. Id.
12. Id. at266.
13. Id.
14. 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 193 (1836).
15. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462, repealed by Act of June 28, 1864, ch. 168, 13
Stat. 200.
16. Maltz, supra note 8, at 267.
17. Id. at 267-68.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 268-69.
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born"-was "a masterpiece of legal craft," the product of "neutral princi-
ples of legal reasoning" that "cannot be characterized as one driven by
politics."'20 On the subject of citizenship, Curtis veered away from the only
other Dred Scott dissenter, John McLean. Maltz makes the point that the
two Justices differed as to political outlook, which influenced their respec-
tive opinions as to black citizenship. 21 Curtis was a compromiser stuck in a
political no-man's land, thereby capable at times of what Maltz repeatedly
called a "dispassionate view."'22 McLean, however, made no attempt to
hide his more radical antislavery views; indeed, he stressed them quite
intentionally and adamantly. 23 I will return to the Justices' competing po-
litical views, and the reality of Curtis's dispassion, a bit later.
Maltz goes on to claim that the "issue of slavery in the territories pre-
sented a much more complex problem for a Justice of Curtis's political
persuasion. '24 Curtis the conservative, Union-protecting Whig knew that
slavery in the territories was an issue that had already proven itself as fod-
der for sectional strife and certainly preferred that this issue just go away.
At the same time, Curtis the compromiser could not tolerate any erosion of
comity-the legal root of compromise-as when the Missouri Supreme
Court in Scott v. Emerson refused to honor the status of Dred Scott in Illi-
nois. 25 Initially, when Dred Scott was argued and reargued in 1856, Curtis
the conservative gladly joined the majority of Justices who chose not to
include the Missouri Compromise as part of the Court's opinion. From the
beginning, Maltz insists, Curtis "clearly believed that the Court should rule
in favor of the Scotts. ' '26 The problem, however, revolved around jurisdic-
tion: Which state's laws rendered the Scotts free? Dred could rely on the
laws of Illinois, but his wife Harriet's claim to freedom (like Dred's second
grounds for freedom) was predicated upon her time in Wisconsin territory,
thus invoking the Missouri Compromise and the constitutionality of prohib-
iting slavery in the territories.
Maltz points out that Curtis provided at least one other reason to hold
in favor of the Scotts, a reason that had nothing to do with slavery in the
territories. 27 This was the marriage of Dred and Harriet. Maltz, like Don
20. Id. at 269. The latter two quotes come from an earlier version of Maltz, supra note 8, as
presented at the symposium held March 31-April 1, 2006 at the University of Texas Law School.
21. See Maltz, supra note 8, at 268.
22. Id. at 265.
23. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 529-64 (1857) (McLean, J., dissenting).
24. Maltz, supra note 8, at 269.
25. See 15 Mo. 576, 586-87 (1852).
26. Maltz, supra note 8, at 269.
27. Id. at 270.
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Fehrenbacher, maintains that Emerson in fact granted his permission for the
Scott marriage in Fort Snelling, Wisconsin. 28 In his dissent, Curtis ob-
served that since slaves could not enter into contracts, Dred and Harriet
were either intentionally or effectively emancipated when Emerson con-
sented to their marriage. 29 Curtis suggested that since the conflict of laws
doctrine bound states to honor the laws of all other states, Missouri was
constitutionally obligated to recognize the Scotts' Wisconsin marriage and
effective emancipation.30 Given that, and especially after Taney and his
fellow Southerners on the bench put the Missouri Compromise on the table,
Curtis could no longer avoid the issue of constitutionality of the 1820
Compromise. Just the same, Maltz asserts, Curtis "was plainly angry that
Taney's opinion had taken on the issue of the constitutionality of restric-
tions on slavery in the territories" and saw it as a "duty" to respond.3 1
That Taney interjected the Missouri Compromise (which many schol-
ars have criticized as obiter dictum) led many to repudiate the Dred Scott
decision. In Maltz's rendition, Taney and Curtis held the shared conviction
that the Constitution clearly granted diversity jurisdiction to federal courts,
but Taney attempted to insulate himself by connecting Scott's (presumed)
non-citizenship to the Court's (resultant) lack of jurisdiction. 32 Curtis re-
sponded to this threat by citing appellate rules of procedure that prevented
arguments not presented in trial. 33 Since Sandford's attorney never argued
Scott's citizenship (but only his race), Curtis posited that the Court was
barred from connecting citizenship to jurisdiction.34 Maltz claims Curtis
never meant that the Court could not consider citizenship at all, only that he
was not persuaded when Scott's lawyer, Montgomery Blair, argued that
Sandford waived the jurisdiction issue, preferring to defend on the merits. 35
Conceding that courts of general jurisdiction would have considered the
jurisdictional objections waived, Curtis (like Taney) contended that juris-
diction is always before the Supreme Court on its own motion.36
On the jurisdictional issue, Maltz professes that Curtis took a narrow
view, claiming that consideration of Scott as a slave was inconsistent with
28. Id.; DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 412 (1978).
29. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 600-01 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
30. See id. at 598-601.
31. Maltz, supra note 8, at 272.
32. Id. at 273.
33. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 588-89 (Curtis, J., dissenting).
34. See id. at 588-90.
35. See Maltz, supra note 8, at 274.
36. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 567 (Curtis, J., dissenting). On matters of jurisdiction,
see generally U.S. CONST. art. I11, § 2.
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the Court's decisions in Livingston v. Story, a diversity action in which the
Court held it could not consider jurisdiction in a general answer rather than
in a jurisdiction specific plea. 37 Taney, by contrast, looked to the holding of
Capron v. Van Noorden, which was not a diversity action on its face but a
case in which the Court decided to hear jurisdictional objections on appeal
even though those objections were not raised in trial. 38
As Maltz sees it, "[n]either case was precisely on point," despite their
apparent similarities to Dred Scott.39 Livingston had sustainable diversity
(in Dred Scott diversity was sufficiently developed); Van Noorden did not
rely on resolution of fact (in Dred Scott the facts were uncontested). And
yet, the procedural questions raised by both Livingston and Van Noorden
were, Maltz insists, "irrelevant to the larger question of whether Taney's
discussion of the Missouri Compromise should be characterized as non-
binding dictum."' 40 The bottom line, as Maltz expresses it, "depends on the
structure of the opinion rather than on the soundness of the analysis in the
opinion."'41 Perhaps most illustrative of Maltz's point, Justices Catron and
McLean determined that the writ of error did not provide for a considera-
tion of jurisdiction, yet neither Justice maintained that the interpretations of
Taney or Curtis (both concluding that the Court had authority to determine
jurisdiction) were dictum. 42
Just as Catron and McLean resisted the charge of dictum on Taney's
and Curtis's conclusions regarding jurisdiction, Maltz claims that Curtis
should have been equally open-minded as to Taney's treatment of the Mis-
souri compromise. Maltz believes that, while Taney may have been "rash,
or even intemperate," he was "most assuredly not extrajudicial," and Maltz
goes on to contend that someone of Curtis's obvious technical proficiency
should have known as much. 43 Given that "his judgment was [likely] dis-
torted by the heat of the controversy, Curtis reached for an untenable argu-
ment in his effort to discredit Taney." 44 Maltz concludes that, however
laudable his doctrinal arguments relating to citizenship, Curtis's attack on
Taney was predicated upon political convictions that left him "willing to
37. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 589-90 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (discussing Livingston v.
Story, 36 U.S. (II Pet.) 351 (1937)).
38. See id. at 401-02 (opinion of the Court) (relying on Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 126 (1804)).
39. Maltz, supra note 8, at 274.
40. Id. at 275.
41. Id.
42. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 518-19, (Catron, J., concurring); id. at 530 (McLean, J.,
dissenting).
43. Maltz, supra note 8, at 275-76.
44. Id. at 276.
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twist doctrine in order to vindicate those beliefs. '45 Maltz leaves the reader
with "a moral of the story," namely that we cannot expect that "even our
most capable jurists will come to more reasoned decisions than other gov-
ernment decision makers. '46
II. DON'T SWEAT THE SMALL STUFF
Earl Maltz, like Benjamin Curtis, has a sophisticated and technical ap-
proach to the law. As he did in his excellent book, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Law of the Constitution, Maltz very usefully measures the
"late-nineteenth-century Court against the principles of distinctively legal
analysis rather than Republican ideology. '47 The challenge when writing
legal history, of course, is to address the technical abilities of both histori-
ans and lawyers, something Maltz does better in his books than in his pa-
per, particularly when dealing with complicated procedural matters (as
pertaining to the jurisdiction debate, for example). Yet, because Maltz has
written elsewhere about citizenship in Dred Scott, the subject gets short
shrift this time around. 48 However, Curtis had much to say about citizen-
ship, and of all the Justices, he came closest to defining what it meant,
promoting a rather elastic notion in which blacks who had been denied the
right to vote were not necessarily or automatically disqualified. 49 Curtis
also advocated a reading of the Constitution that held out both hope and
promise for change and progress. At one juncture, he opined, "though... I
do not think the enjoyment of the elective franchise essential to citizenship,
there can be no doubt it is one of the chiefest attributes of citizenship under
the American Constitution[] ... decisive evidence of citizenship. '50 He
went on to assert "in five of the thirteen original States, colored persons
possessed the elective franchise" at the Founding, thus "it is not true, in
point of fact, that the Constitution was made exclusively by the white
race.
51
Sticking with the small stuff for another moment, Maltz's paper has
one or two easily repaired hiccups, like domiciling John McLean in Penn-
sylvania rather than Ohio. The paper would also benefit from a round of
clarifications or elaborations. For example, Maltz never elucidates his sug-
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. MALTZ, FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, supra note 7, at viii,
48. See Earl M. Maltz, The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Consti-
tutional Law of Slavery, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 1995 (1996).
49. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 582-83 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 581.
51. Id. at 582.
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gestion that Curtis's argument relating to the Scott marriage was "doctri-
nally suspect. '52 He simply mentions the argument's political facility for a
conservative Justice reluctant to fuel sectional strife by opining on the con-
stitutionality issue yet eager to free the Scotts. 53 Nor does Maltz explain
why Curtis "clearly believed that the Court should rule in favor of the
Scotts. ' '54 The bigger concern with Maltz's paper, however, relates to the
title, or theme, namely, Curtis and his supposed "anger."
III. JUST How ANGRY WAS CURTIS, REALLY?
While Maltz's paper is understandably focused on the Dred Scott dis-
sent, his theme conjures the words of Horace, the Latin poet and son of an
ex-slave, who wrote, "Anger is a short madness. ' 55 As stated above, Maltz
insists that when it came to the constitutionality of the Missouri Compro-
mise, Curtis lost his way and was "plainly angry." 56 Early in his paper,
Maltz states, "[T]he opinion reveals a Curtis who is quite angry with the
Southern Justices for their decision to reach the issue of the constitutional-
ity of the Missouri Compromise, and whose analysis appears to have been
distorted by this anger."'57 That observation contrasts sharply with the more
traditional view; take Fehrenbacher for example, who suggested that, as it
relates to the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise restriction,
"both McLean and Curtis assumed the Republican position of interpreting
the territory clause broadly," and that "Curtis, in particular, probed the
weakness of this argument with an irony that was all the more effective
because of its judicial coolness. ' 58 Maltz never informs the reader as to
how Curtis's judgment suffered by his anger or what mistakes he made.
But was Curtis angry? Maltz portrays Curtis as legally principled and
dispassionate on the citizenship issue, but politically engaged and angry as
to the Missouri Compromise. Curtis's opinion, says Maltz, "that national
citizenship depended on the law of the state in which the person was born
cannot be characterized as one driven by politics. '59 Maltz says Justice
McLean, on the other hand, was politically motivated on the issue of citi-
52. Maltz, supra note 8, at 271.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 269.
55. Horace, Epistles, book 1, epistle 2, reprinted in HORACE FOR ENGLISH READERS 269 (E.C.
Wickham trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1930).
56. Maltz, supra note 8, at 272.
57. Id. at 265.
58. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 28, at 409.
59. This quote comes from an earlier version of Maltz, supra note 8, as presented at the sympo-
sium held March 31-April 1, 2006 at the University of Texas Law School.
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zenship, using it as "a convenient vehicle to appeal to Radical Republi-
cans."'60 So, why was Curtis able to maintain his composure on citizenship
and not on the constitutionality of the Compromise? And might Curtis's
"dispassionate," "neutral principles of legal reasoning," have actually been
a passionately political attempt to maintain the peace between North and
South? That McLean favored racial justice seems no more political than
Curtis supporting national harmony.
At one point in his paper, Maltz states that Curtis's anger was "in
many respects entirely understandable" since, after all, Southern Justices
could have found against the Scotts without opining on the Missouri Com-
promise, and the very idea of settling the long-standing debate about slav-
ery in the territories by judicial decision "can only be seen as a product of
extreme judicial hubris."'6 1 Not only did Curtis resent the politics of
Taney's decision, he refused to stomach the extrajudicial character of it.
In fact, as Maltz observes, ".... Curtis infuriated Taney by asserting
that he did not hold the Court's opinion on the constitutionality of the Mis-
souri Compromise binding because it was 'expressed on a question not
legitimately before it.'62 Clearly, there was plenty of anger to go around.
The notion that Taney was actually the angry Justice is consistent with the
conclusion of Stuart Streichler, Curtis's only non-family biographer, who
claimed, "Curtis's charge of judicial overreaching had rankled the chief
justice. '63 Paul Finkelman also, in his book on the Dred Scott case, charac-
terized Taney as "a seething, angry, uncompromising supporter of the
South and slavery .... ,"64 Curtis strove for compromise, but the proslavery
Justices-five in total, all from slaveholding families-wanted confronta-
tion and final resolution regarding slavery in the territories and black
rights.65 It is of course possible that any of several antebellum Justices
qualified for the "angry man" moniker.
60. Maltz, supra note 8, at 268.
61. Id. at 273.
62. Id. at 272-73 (emphasis added).
63. STUART STREICHLER, JUSTICE CURTIS IN THE CIVIL WAR ERA: AT THE CROSSROADS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 146 (2005).
64. PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 29
(1997). It is important to note that the Southern Justices had their work cut out for them. If they ruled
that blacks could not be citizens, the case was over, and the territories issue would remain unresolved.
To rule the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, on the other hand, they would have had to acknowl-
edge jurisdiction (only possible if Scott were free and/or a citizen), thus confirming black rights.
65. The Dred Scott case may well have yielded a compromise. Justice Samuel Nelson drafted an
opinion that was intended to be the "opinion of the Court" in which the precedent of Strader v. Graham,
51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850), that every state had total authority to decide the status of all its residents,
would have been adopted. THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at
143-44 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT JUSTICES].
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As to Curtis's anger, however, there are one or two other key matters
to consider. Maltz never even mentions due process in his paper, a topic he
addressed to great effect in his book on the Fourteenth Amendment.
Taney's introduction of due process in the majority opinion for Dred Scott
is historic. As Stuart Streichler observed in his wonderfully clear and co-
gent intellectual history of Curtis's legal legacy, published just last year,
"[I]t is easy to overlook the quiet evolution in due process that occurred in
the Civil War era."'66 Streichler uncovered a seminal twist toward substan-
tive due process when Curtis delivered the opinion in Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. (1856), which imbued due process with
a "superconstitutional" status by connecting it to Magna Carta's "law of the
land" and rendering it an appropriate ground for judicial review of legisla-
tion.67 By Streichler's account, Curtis essentially invented substantive due
process one year before Taney stretched the Fifth Amendment in Dred
Scott to invalidate the Missouri Compromise, thus giving Curtis cause to
resent Taney for misappropriating this novel notion of judicial exertion.
But Taney had begun to think in terms of substantive due process even
earlier, as evidenced by Bloomer v. McQuewan, an 1852 case regarding
patent rights. In Bloomer, the Chief Justice offered in dictum that "Con-
gress legislated on the principle decided by this court in Evans v.
Eaton ... [a]nd any other construction would make the legislation of Con-
gress, on these various special laws, inconsistent with itself," such that "the
power of Congress to pass it would be open to serious objections" and "cer-
tainly could not be regarded as due process of law."'68 Although the two
Justices were simultaneously expanding upon due process in the 1850s, it is
unlikely Curtis approved of Taney's use of the concept in Dred Scott.
The most obvious argument to underscore Curtis's anger, however,
which Maltz very curiously fails to even mention, is his resignation from
the bench. The list of Justices who have resigned from office, as opposed to
retired, includes fourteen Associates and two Chiefs.69 Six of the first
66. STREICHLER, supra note 63, at 98.
67. See id. at 98-101; see also Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272, 276 (1856). Substantive Due Process was more fully developed two decades later. In
the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana state law granting monopoly rights,
thus rejecting the plaintiffs' (butchers) due process claim that their "right to labor" had been violated.
See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The Court chose not to use due process in a substantive fashion. In
1877, however, the majority in Munn v. Illinois, found that economic regulations could indeed result in
a dispossession of private property without due process. See 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
68. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852). lam indebted to Mark Graber for bringing this case to my
attention.
69. See BADER & MERSKY, supra note 3, at 76-81. The two Chief Justices to resign were John
Jay, in 1795, and Oliver Ellsworth, in 1799. The southern Democrat John Campbell of Alabama left to
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twelve Justices resigned. Six more Justices resigned in the twentieth cen-
tury, the last (and perhaps most exciting) being Abe Fortas who resigned in
a hurry in 1969.70 But between Gabriel Duvall in 1835 and Charles Evans
Hughes in 1916, there were only three resignations from the Court. John
Campbell of Alabama resigned days after Fort Sumter to join the Confed-
eracy (unlike his fellow Southerner on the Court, Nathan Clifford, who
condemned secession as "wicked heresy"); and David Davis, who re-
sponded to the allure of public office when the Illinois legislature elected
him to the Senate in 1877. 71 Benjamin Robbins Curtis, on the other hand,
the one-time "slave-catcher" judge, expressed his outrage at the Court's
Dred Scott majority decision and his personal frustration with Taney, by
resigning in September 1857.72 A resignation of this nature, following such
a public spat between Justices, represented a first (and only) in the history
of the Supreme Court.
Streichler 73 devoted one of the three sections of his chapter on Dred
Scott to Curtis's resignation. The reason for Curtis's resignation has long
been debated. Was his resignation a principled repudiation of the majority
in Dred Scott? Did he leave because of the furious and vituperative com-
munications he had with Taney? Or was it that the Justice was dissatisfied
with his rather meager $6,000 annual salary, which his brother and biogra-
pher George Ticknor Curtis called the "controlling" factor? 74 The answer is
complicated by the fact that Curtis pulled his punches on the way out. Fur-
thermore, there is no evidence to suggest he contemplated resignation prior
to the Dred Scott decision. Streichler concluded that "Curtis resigned on
grounds of principle. ' 75 If so, this realization, in combination with the fact
that he was the only Supreme Court Justice to ever resign in that fashion,
join the Confederacy in 1861, and David Davis resigned in 1877. And, of course, Benjamin Curtis
resigned out of protest to Dred Scott in 1857.
70. Id. Fortas resigned amidst threats of impeachment, and public condemnation, weeks after Life
magazine revealed that Fortas had accepted a possible bribe from an indicted stock manipulator, Louis
Wolfson. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE & RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 196-
200, 207-09, 545-77 (1988).
71. On John Campbell's resignation on April 26, 1861, see SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note
65, at 163. On Nathan Clifford, see id. at 169. On David Davis's resignation, see 7 CHARLES FAIRMAN,
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 498 (1987).
72. SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 65, at 159. Once the Court adjourned in March 1857,
Curtis filed his dissent with the Court clerk and also sent it to a Boston newspaper. Taney revised his
opinion to incorporate Curtis's various objections to the case, after which weeks of bitter correspon-
dence ensued. The rift between the two Justices became publicly ugly.
73. Maltz and Streichler reference one another's work.
74. STREICHLER, supra note 63, at 148.
75. Id. Though it is tempting to accept Streichler's assessment, it seems more likely that Curtis's
brother had it right and the Justice resigned for pecuniary reasons.
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would suggest Justice Curtis may indeed have been the last and only angry
man.
But anger, however principled, has its clearly ugly side. Many con-
temporaries felt betrayed when the Justice chose not to persevere in trou-
bled times. 76 Still others, like Charles Francis Adams, thought it painfully
ironic that Curtis should appear "to posterity as a champion of principles,
for his opposition to which he obtained his seat on the bench."'77
IV. ONE LAST OBSERVATION, NOT RELATED TO ANGRY JUSTICES
Allow me one last observation, relating to the previously mentioned
differences between Curtis and McLean. As noted above, six of the first
twelve Supreme Court Justices resigned. 78 That is an indicator of the per-
ceived unimportance of the position by comparison to today. Addressing
that same point from another angle, consider this. Not only did the two
Dred Scott dissenters differ as to political outlook, as Maltz observes, they
also differed as to political ambition, further revealing the place of the Su-
preme Court in antebellum American government. Curtis came to the Su-
preme Court as a respected lawyer and legal reformer, McLean as a career
politician. 79 In his Dred Scott dissent, McLean underscored antislavery as
part of his bid for the Republican nomination for president. McLean, like
Salmon Chase after him, saw the Supreme Court as a springboard to the
executive branch, a position both McLean and Chase labored for their en-
tire lives. The notion of a lifetime commitment to the Court, to say nothing
of the supremacy of that Court, had yet to be fully established at the time of
the Civil War. I argue elsewhere that the power and influence of the ante-
bellum Supreme Court, as suggested by the Dred Scott decision, is too
often exaggerated.80 Yes, Lincoln and the Radical Republicans were fearful
of what the Court, in light of Dred Scott, might do. But, in 1857, most
76. See id. at 149.
77. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
78. See BADER & MERSKY, supra note 3, at 76-77.
79. Curtis practiced law in Boston. He served one term in the Massachusetts legislature where he
devoted all his energies to legal reform. After proposing a commission for judicial reform, Curtis was
named chairman and spearheaded a more efficient code of court procedure. McLean served as one of
six Ohioans in the House of Representatives from 1812-16. He ran for the Senate in 1822, was com-
missioner of General Land Office, and aspired for the presidency his whole life. According to the
Supreme Court Historical Society biography of McLean, "his political activities while on the high
bench are perhaps unparalleled in history of the Court. McLean carried on successive flirtations for the
presidential nomination with several political parties .... SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 65,
at 103.
80. 1 make this argument in my Yale University Ph.D. dissertation, provisionally entitled "Lin-
coln's Justices: The Supreme Court from Dred Scott to the Civil Rights Cases." The dissertation is
currently a work in progress.
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Americans were not concerned about whether blacks could be citizens.
And, as most of us know, Congress had already essentially overturned the
Missouri Compromise with the Kansas-Nebraska Act.81 With the Recon-
struction amendments, however, Americans reversed the Dred Scott deci-
sion, thus confirming that Congress had the authority to eliminate slavery
(not just in the territories, but altogether), blacks could be citizens, and
blacks had rights whites were obligated to respect. Around the time Benja-
min Curtis resigned from the bench, the image and power of the Court
waned rather substantially from whatever status it achieved under Chiefs
Marshall and Taney. The eventual supremacy of the Court would soon
unfold, a supremacy precipitated by America's need to assimilate citizens
like Dred Scott. 8 2
81. Act of May 30, 1854, ch. 59, 10 Stat. 277 (organizing the territories of Nebraska and Kansas).
82. In actuality, Dred Scott died in September 1858, nine months after the Blows purchased his
freedom. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 28, at 568.
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